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Abstract
For the past few decades, there has been intense debate in bioethics about the standard of care that should
be provided in clinical trials conducted in developing countries. Some interpret the Declaration of Helsinki to mean that control groups should receive the best intervention available worldwide, while others
interpret this and other international guidelines to mean the best local standard of care. Questions of
justice are particularly relevant where limited resources mean that the local standard of care is no care at
all. Introducing human rights law into this complex and longstanding debate adds a new and important
perspective. Through non-derogable rights, including the core obligations of the right to health, human
rights law can help set a minimum standard of care.
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Introduction
Protecting human dignity and preventing
exploitation are core concepts in both bioethics
and human rights. In fact, the principles that
guide biomedical research ethics were developed
in response to specific incidents of exploitation,
including the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Yet
the rapid globalization of biomedical research in
recent decades presents new challenges in preventing
exploitation. Affluent countries and multinational
corporations now commonly conduct clinical
trials in developing countries, a practice known as
“off-shoring.”1 The advantages of this practice for
the sponsors of the trials are clear: it significantly
reduces the cost of trials, sometimes as much as
90%, helps avoid the increasingly bureaucratic
regulatory environment in many wealthy countries,
and renders legal accountability extremely unlikely.2
However, these same factors increase the risk that
research subjects will be exploited, especially since
nearly half of the clinical trials in developing trials
escape review by an ethics committee.3
One of the ongoing debates within bioethics
related to the practice of “off-shoring” pertains to
the standard of care owed to participants in clinical
trials. Specifically, there is a dispute over when the
use of placebo or no intervention for the control
group is permissible. The Declaration of Helsinki,
which provides ethical principles for medical
research involving human subjects, generally
requires researchers to test new interventions
against the “best proven intervention.”4 The plain
text of the Declaration does not clarify whether this
means the best intervention available worldwide or
the best intervention available locally. Some argue
that providing the best worldwide standard of care
is simply not feasible in developing countries and
may obstruct important research that could improve
health conditions in those countries. On the other
hand, the unavailability of interventions in many
developing countries often means the local standard
of care is very limited or no care at all, creating a
double standard in clinical trials involving the rich
and the poor.5
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In this article, we argue that international human
rights principles are relevant to the standard of
care debate and help define a middle ground that
recognizes the practical challenges involved in
providing the best worldwide intervention while
also setting a minimum standard of care for
control groups. Examining the standard of care issue
through a human rights lens helps draw attention
to the obligations of the States that both sponsor
and host the trials, including their obligations to
regulate corporations, rather than focusing on
the subject-researcher relationship.6 Harnessing the
language of human rights also helps build power
among disadvantaged groups, which fuels advocacy
and organizing efforts to challenge exploitation.
Perhaps most importantly, applying complementary
human rights principles can help provide guidance
in situations where invoking bioethical principles
alone leads to conflicting conclusions.7
Bioethics builds on the basic principles of
autonomy, beneficence, and justice, which are
non-hierarchical and require careful balancing of
factors such as potential risks and benefits. Human
rights law, on the other hand, identifies certain
non-derogable rights from which no deviation
is permitted, even in times of crisis. To the extent
that hierarchy exists among human rights, these
non-derogable rights represent the apex and cannot
be balanced against other interests. We argue that
these non-derogable rights, including the core
obligations of the right to health, help establish a
minimum standard of care for control groups in
clinical trials.

International guidelines on biomedical
research: Equivocal ethics?
The debate over the standard of care in clinical
trials intensified in the 1990s, when placebocontrolled trials of AZT, a drug used to prevent the
perinatal transmission of HIV, were conducted in
numerous developing countries.8 Since effective
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alternative treatments were available at the time
in developed countries, Lurie and Wolf critiqued
the use of placebos in these trials, arguing that
allowing research methods that would have been
unacceptable in the sponsoring country created a
double standard and imposed unnecessary risks
to participants.9 Critics responded that the use of
placebos was necessary to obtain scientifically valid
results that ultimately benefited the population as a
whole.10 The issue of when placebos are permissible
remains unresolved today, despite international
guidance from multiple organizations.
One of the challenges is that different
organizations have conflicting views. In 1949, WHO
and UNESCO jointly established the Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS), an international nongovernmental
organization which in 1993 published “International
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects.” These guidelines, most
recently updated in 2002, generally require the
control group to receive an “established effective
intervention” but allow for exceptions where: (1)
there is no established effective intervention; (2)
withholding the established effective intervention
would expose subjects, at most, to temporary
discomfort or delay in relief of symptoms; or (3) use
of an established effective intervention would not
yield scientifically reliable results and use of placebo
would not add any risk of serious or irreversible
harm.11
The commentary that explains these guidelines
indicates certain additional conditions for invoking
an exception.12 First, the study should be designed
to develop an intervention for use in a country
where an established effective intervention is
unlikely to become widely available (or available at
all), usually due to cost or logistics. Furthermore,
the purpose of the study should be to make an
effective alternative available in that country. This
means the investigational intervention should
respond to the health needs of the population from
which research subjects are recruited and be made
reasonably available to that population if it proves
safe and effective. Finally, scientific and ethical
review committees must determine that using an
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established effective intervention would not yield
scientifically reliable results that would be relevant
to the health needs of the study population. Thus,
both benefit to the host community and scientific
necessity are required.
In addition to the CIOMS guidelines, there is the
Declaration of Helsinki, which was issued by the
World Medical Association (WMA) in 1964 and
likely represents the most influential statement of
ethical principles for medical research involving
human subjects. The Declaration also tends to be
the focus of the standard of care debate because its
language suggests a universal standard.13 Over the
years, the Declaration has been revised nine times,
including multiple revisions pertaining to the
standard of care. Since 2008, the Declaration has
required new interventions to be tested against the
“best proven intervention” with two exceptions.14
The use of placebo or no intervention for the
control group is permitted: (1) when “no proven
intervention” exists; or (2) when there are sound
methodological reasons to deviate from the “best
proven intervention” and no additional risk of
serious or irreversible harm.15 Prior versions of the
Declaration, issued in 2002 and 2004, were more
permissive with the use of placebos, allowing an
exception solely for methodological reasons, but
that triggered criticism that scientific grounds alone
cannot determine whether the research design is
ethical.
Comparing the Declaration to the CIOMS
guidelines, it may initially appear that the
Declaration imposes a higher standard of care
because it requires the “best proven intervention,”
rather than just an “established effective
intervention.” Unfortunately, the Declaration fails
to specify whether this “best proven intervention”
is based on international or local availability.
Some argue that using a worldwide standard
would be at odds with the international consensus,
while others dispute that any such consensus
exists.16 Furthermore, some argue that it would be
unreasonable to require all countries to provide
the best worldwide standard of care, while others
find it unreasonable to use a local standard that is
determined largely by prices set by pharmaceutical
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companies.17 In light of this ongoing debate, it
remains unclear whether the Declaration’s standard
is actually higher than the CIOMS standard. The
Declaration also does not include the restrictions
mentioned in the commentary on the CIOMS
guidelines, such as benefit to the host community.
A third organization that is more permissive with
the use of placebos than either CIOMS or the WMA
is the International Conference of Harmonization
(ICH), comprised of the US, European Union, Japan,
and experts from the pharmaceutical industry. In
2001, the ICH adopted guidelines entitled Choice of
Control Group and Related Issues in Clinical Trials
(CCG).18 While the US abandoned the Declaration
of Helsinki in 2008, it continues to endorse the CCG
guidance, which provides only one rule restricting
the use of placebos. The CCG states that “[i]n cases
where an available treatment is known to prevent
serious harm, such as death or irreversible morbidity
in the study population, it is generally inappropriate
to use a placebo control” (emphasis added).19 In
other situations, “it is generally considered ethical
to ask patients to participate in a placebo-controlled
trial, even if they may experience discomfort as a
result, provided the setting is noncoercive and
patients are fully informed about available therapies
and the consequences of delaying treatment.”20
Thus, in trials where there is no risk of serious harm,
placebos may be used as long as there is informed
consent.
As further guidance, the CCG notes, “Whether
a particular placebo-controlled trial is ethical may
in some cases depend on what is believed to have
been clinically demonstrated under the particular
circumstances of the trial,” which suggests that a trial
may be deemed ethical in hindsight and justified
if the overall benefit outweighs the harm involved
in using placebos.21 The CCG also recommends
considering modifications to the research design,
such as “early escape” from ineffective therapy,
a limited placebo period, or an “add-on” study,
where the new intervention is added to standard
treatment, as ways to reduce ethical concerns.22
These statements reflect some recognition that
the restriction on use of placebos only in cases of
serious harm does not eliminate ethical concerns.
We believe these various approaches to the
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use of placebos leave participants in developing
countries vulnerable to exploitation for several
reasons. First, the guidelines discussed above
do not set any hard rules prohibiting the use of
placebos in certain situations. Avoiding clear
rules and relying on determinations of scientific
necessity or benefit to the host community might
be feasible if trial protocols received careful review,
but many protocols in developing countries never
come before ethics committees, as mentioned above.
Furthermore, insofar as the guidelines permit a
local standard of care, they fail to take into account
the serious public health consequences of not
providing treatment, especially for infectious and
epidemic diseases. In addition, liberally permitting
placebos based on the local standard of care due to
lack of resources in the host country ignores the
international obligations of high-income countries
to provide assistance in improving access to health
care in developing countries. Lastly, the international
guidelines examined here do not mention special
protections for particularly vulnerable populations
as a condition of involving them in placebocontrolled trials.
In light of these concerns and the persistent
controversy surrounding the appropriate standard
of care, we propose using human rights law as
a complementary framework to help move the
discussion forward. While human rights law does
not settle the debate, it can be interpreted and
applied in ways that help establish a minimum
standard of care. If no such baseline of care is
established, then when a country cracks down on
ethical violations, clinical trials will simply move
to another poor country with a weak regulatory
regime. This is exactly what has happened in
India, where clinical trials have dropped by 93% in
response to the government’s recent efforts to stop
unnecessary deaths.23

A human rights approach to the standard of
care in clinical trials
To date, international human rights bodies have
issued only very limited guidance on the applicability of human rights norms to clinical research trials.
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The only major report on this topic, issued by the
Special Rapporteur on the right to health in 2009,
pertains to informed consent.24 This report includes
a single sentence flagging the standard of care as
an area of concern: “It continues to be questioned
whether conducting clinical trials in developing
countries can ever be considered ethical, especially
when using placebos despite the existence of appropriate non-placebo interventions.”25 Recognizing the
need for ethics review boards to “eliminate double
standards applied to developing countries,” the
Special Rapporteur called for “the most protective
standards” if conducting research abroad changes
the requirements for informed consent.26
Similarly, we utilize the human rights framework
to call for protective standards when conducting
research in a developing country changes
requirements regarding the standard of care. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
both have provisions relevant to the standard of
care in clinical trials. The ICCPR includes at least
three relevant non-derogable rights: the rights
to life, freedom from nonconsensual medical
experimentation, and nondiscrimination.
In addition, the ICESCR provides a right to
the “highest attainable standard of health,” which
is generally subject to progressive realization
but has certain “core obligations” that must be
implemented immediately. In General Comment
14, an authoritative interpretation of the right to
health, the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) enumerates these “core
obligations” and explains that “a State party cannot,
under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its
noncompliance with the core obligations . . . which
are non-derogable.”27 Since the core obligations of
the right to health are non-derogable, they reflect
the minimum core content of the right to health, the
non-negotiable foundation of the right to which all
individuals are entitled, regardless of the economic
situation in a country. Such clear prioritization of
certain aspects of the right to health is striking,
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since CESCR does not always describe the core
obligations of a right as non-derogable.28
We argue that these non-derogable rights,
including the core obligations of the right to
health, provide guidance in setting a minimum
standard of care for clinical trials. Although the
concept of minimum core obligations has been
subject to various criticisms, it remains one of the
two main ways that tribunals approach economic
and social rights and is therefore highly relevant.29
Furthermore, by emphasizing the responsibilities
of developed countries to provide assistance and
regulate corporations, this proposal counters the
criticism that focusing on minimum core obligations
ignores the violations of affluent countries.
Since governments are the primary dutybearers in the international human rights system,
one question that arises is what if the sponsor
of the clinical trial is a non-state actor, such as a
pharmaceutical company? General Comment 14
helps answer these questions by emphasizing that
“States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the
right to health in other countries, and to prevent
third parties from violating the right [to health] in
other countries, if they are able to influence these
third parties by way of legal or political means.”30
Even more specifically, General Comment 14
describes “the failure to regulate the activities of . . .
corporations so as to prevent them from violating
the right to health of others” as a violation of the
obligation to protect.31 Thus, “Violations of the right
to health can occur through the direct action of
States or other entities insufficiently regulated by
States.”32 These provisions impose a responsibility on
States to regulate domestic and foreign clinical trials
in ways that protect human rights. The standards
that developed countries adopt for approving
investigations of new drugs and marketing of drugs
based on foreign clinical trials should be consistent
with the core obligations of the right to health.
Similarly, developing countries need to ensure that
proposals to conduct clinical trials undergo close
scrutiny by independent ethics committees that
apply standards designed to uphold these rights.
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Deprivation of essential drugs, as defined by
WHO
One of the core obligations of the right to health
is “[t]o provide essential drugs, as defined under
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs.”33
This is the most well-defined core obligation, since
it references a specific list of medications. In 1975,
WHO defined essential drugs as “those considered
to be of the utmost importance and hence basic,
indispensable and necessary for the health needs
of the population.”34 Two years later, despite major
opposition from the pharmaceutical industry,
WHO published its first Model List of Essential
Drugs, which included the generic names of more
than 200 drugs and vaccines, most of which were
no longer protected by patents.35 The Model List has
since been updated every two years and serves as a
guide for countries in creating their own national
lists. By relying on WHO’s expertise in defining this
core obligation, CESCR stresses “the key function
assigned to WHO is realizing the right to health.”36
Some commentators have critiqued the
core obligation to provide essential drugs as
impracticable, arguing that few states can comply
due to resource limitations.37 One response is that
developing countries can take certain measures that
are inexpensive, such as removing legal barriers
to accessing essential drugs. For example, certain
analgesics on the list of essential drugs remain
very difficult to access in developing countries. The
Special Rapporteur on the right to health has noted,
“Although the developing world has nearly half of
the world’s cancer patients and nearly all new HIV
infections, it consumes only 6 percent of the licit
morphine supply.”38 In fact, “About 89 percent of all
legally controlled medicines, including morphine,
is consumed by North America and Europe.”39
Another response to the criticism based on
resource limitations is that CESCR imposes a duty
on “States parties and other actors in a position
to assist, to provide ‘international assistance and
cooperation, especially economic and technical’
which enable developing countries to fulfill their
core . . . obligations.”40 CESCR specifically provides
that, “Depending on the availability of resources,
States should facilitate access to essential health
JUNE 2015
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facilities, goods and services in other countries,
wherever possible and provide the necessary aid
when required.”41 Taking these obligations into
consideration, we propose that the minimum
standard of care in clinical trials should include
providing essential drugs, as defined by WHO, to
the control group; if the trial takes place in a country
where the essential drug is not readily available,
then the sponsor of the trial, which stands to reap
the profits, should cover the cost of providing the
essential drug. This proposal is not unprecedented.
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies similarly advises that the sponsor
should pay if an intervention is not available due to
cost, and South Africa requires all participants in
HIV vaccine research to have access to high quality
treatment financed by the sponsors of the trials.42
Shifting the financial burden to the sponsor of
the trial not only challenges how core obligations
are typically construed, but also creates an incentive
for developed countries to support donor programs
designed to promote access to essential drugs, for
example through their membership in international
financial organizations. Such action would reinforce
CESCR’s position that “international financial
institutions, notably the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, should pay greater
attention to the protection of the right to health
in their lending policies, credit agreements and
structural adjustment programmes.”43
One limitation in using the WHO list of essential
drugs to establish a minimum standard of care is
that new drugs are not added to this list until clinical
trials establishing their efficacy are completed. For
example, while antiretroviral drugs for HIV are
now included, there were no medications for HIV
on the list in the 1990s when ethical controversies
arose about the failure to provide HIV-positive
control groups with any treatment.44 The principles
proposed below help address this limitation.

Use of placebos in trials involving lifethreatening illnesses
The right to life, set forth in Article 6 of the ICCPR,
is “the supreme right from which no derogation
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is permitted even in time of public emergency.”45
According to the Human Rights Committee (HRC),
which interprets the ICCPR, the right to life should
not be interpreted narrowly. We contend that respect
for the right to life prohibits the use of placebos in
trials involving treatable illnesses that may result in
serious harm or death. This interpretation provides
a bright-line rule, unlike the CCG guidelines, which,
as discussed above, simply state that it is “generally
inappropriate” to use placebos for treatable illnesses
that may result in serious harm.
A more difficult question arises when there is a
life-threatening illness with high mortality rates and
only experimental treatments are available, as in
the case of Ebola. All of the international bioethics
guidelines discussed in the previous section allow
the use of placebos where no proven treatment
exists. Yet there is currently a heated debate over
whether clinical trials involving Ebola interventions
should use placebos (plus basic supportive care) for
the control group. The US government plans to
conduct Ebola trials with placebos, but Médecins
Sans Frontiers, WHO, and a coalition of European
countries have all rejected this approach, opting
instead for trials involving multiple experimental
interventions.46 While this specific debate is beyond
the scope of this article, we note that even scientists
who support the use of placebo trials for Ebola agree
that as soon as an experimental drug shows some
benefit, it should become the new standard of care
for all treatment groups.47 One approach short of
providing experimental treatments to all groups in
such situations may be requiring the use of adaptive
experimental designs to minimize the loss of life.48
The CCG mentions that such “modifications” may
help avoid ethical concerns but does not require
them.

Use of placebos in trials involving major
infectious, epidemic, or endemic diseases
Of “comparable priority” to the non-derogable
core obligations are the obligations to “provide
immunizations against major infectious diseases”
and “take measures to prevent, treat, and control
epidemic and endemic diseases.”49 These obligations
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reflect a public health approach, emphasizing
the collective aspects of the right to health.50
While the former obligation is absolute, like the
obligation to provide essential drugs, the latter uses
the limiting language of “taking measures.” We
therefore approach these two obligations differently.
Regarding trials involving immunizations for major
infectious diseases, we take the same hard line
that we took for essential drugs, which is that the
sponsor should pay for the control groups to receive
an immunization known to be safe and effective,
rather than a placebo, if such an intervention is
not available in the host country. With respect to
clinical trials involving the treatment of epidemic
and endemic disease, we adopt a more nuanced
analysis.
As a precursor to this analysis, we define the
terms “epidemic” and “endemic.” According to the
Dictionary of Epidemiology, a disease is an “epidemic”
when its occurrence in a given community or region
clearly exceeds the normal expectancy, while it is
“endemic” if constantly present within a geographic
area or population group.51 The Encyclopedia
Britannica further explains:
When a disease is prevalent in an area over long
periods of time, it is considered to be endemic in
that area. When the prevalence of disease is subject to wide fluctuations in time, it is considered
to be epidemic during periods of high prevalence.
Epidemics prevailing over wide geographic areas
are called pandemics.52

Endemic and epidemic diseases claim countless
lives, stifle human development, and drain health
care systems, especially in developing countries with
weak infrastructures. They therefore tend to be top
priorities in setting health policies, and combating
them is foundational to the right to health.
If an epidemic or endemic disease can be
treated by an essential drug or is life threatening,
then, under the principles discussed above, the
use of placebo would be prohibited. In other
situations, we contend that the obligation to “take
measures” should include, at a minimum, having
certain protections in place if placebos are used.
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This approach is consistent with the one taken by
the Special Rapporteur on the right to health in
the report on informed consent, which stressed
that “A rights-based approach to medical research
means that special protections must be in place to
ensure that the autonomy of potential participants,
particularly those from vulnerable groups, is not
compromised as a result of power imbalances
inherent in the research-subject relationships.”53
In suggesting these particular protective
measures, we are mindful of the dearth of guidance
from human rights bodies or courts. We therefore
take into consideration the protections mentioned
in the Special Rapporteur’s report on informed
consent, as well as a 2004 article by David Wendler
and his colleagues arguing that the default position
of ethics review boards should be to require the
best worldwide standard of care unless certain
conditions are met.54 The protections we propose
are as follows: (1) participation risks must be
minimized, for example through adaptive research
designs; (2) the trials must be medically necessary
(i.e., previous research should not obviate the need
for additional research); (3) the use of placebos must
be scientifically necessary to answer the question
addressed in the trial; (4) the study must address
important health needs for the host community;
(5) a fair level of benefit must be conferred on
participants; and (6) participants should not be
worse off than if the trial had not occurred. The
investigator should bear the responsibility of
demonstrating that all of these protections are in
place in order to use placebos in trials involving
epidemic or endemic diseases.

Use of placebos with vulnerable or
marginalized groups
The current debate over the Ebola trials highlights
not only conflicting views about how to handle
pandemics when no proven intervention is available,
but also concerns about the use of placebos with
vulnerable groups. Clement Adebamowo, for
example, has argued that terrified populations
cannot be expected to give informed consent in
the midst of a raging epidemic, especially if they
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are distrustful of health centers and aid workers.55
In considering the use of placebos with vulnerable
groups, we examine the interpretations of the HRC
in General Comment 20 and relevant concluding
observations, as well as the report on informed
consent from the Special Rapporteur on the right to
health. As above, we follow the Special Rapporteur’s
lead in recommending heightened protective
measures for the use of placebos with vulnerable
groups.
Three non-derogable rights are relevant to the
use of placebos with vulnerable groups. First, there
is the prohibition against subjecting individuals
to medical experimentation without their “free
consent” under Article 7 of the ICCPR.56 Second,
there is the core obligation of the right to health
that requires States parties to “ensure the right of
access to health facilities, goods and services on a
non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable
or marginalized groups.”57 Third, there is the nonderogable prohibition against discrimination based
on “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status,” which appears in both
conventions.58
The HRC has interpreted “free consent” broadly
to take into account the potential for exploitation
or coercion. In cases where an individual’s personal
characteristics or life situation create a serious risk
of exploitation, the HRC has advised exclusion
from clinical trials that may be harmful to health.
For example, the HRC has indicated that detainees
and prisoners “should not be subjected to any
medical or scientific experimentation that may
be detrimental to their health.”59 Similarly, in its
Concluding Observations for the Netherlands,
the HRC has opined that certain vulnerable
populations, including minors and others who
cannot give genuine consent, must not be subjected
to medical experiments that do not benefit them
directly.60 The HRC has also expressed concern
about the US practice of allowing research to be
“conducted on persons vulnerable to coercion
or undue influence such as children, prisoners,
pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or
economically disadvantaged persons.”61
Critics of excluding vulnerable groups from
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clinical trials contend that doing so risks undue
paternalism, and that requiring informed consent
with appropriate disclosure techniques and payment
of a fair benefit provide adequate protection against
exploitation. They further argue that exclusion
interferes with obtaining generalizable results, and
that “vulnerability” itself is a problematic category
that risks over-inclusion of heterogeneous groups.62
While these may be valid concerns, the HRC
and the Special Rapporteur have already helped
define certain vulnerable groups and have made
it clear that special protections should apply. We
therefore propose permitting the use of placebos on
vulnerable groups in developing countries only if
heightened protective measures are in place. These
measures incorporate, modify, and add to the ones
mentioned above in order to take into account
concerns regarding vulnerable populations.
Specifically, we incorporate the protections
requiring the sponsor to demonstrate that
participation risks are minimized, the trials
are medically necessary, the use of placebos is
scientifically necessary, and the participants are not
worse off than if the trial had not been conducted.
In addition, drawing on the Special Rapporteur’s
report, we propose that the investigators should
demonstrate that: (1) no comparably effective
alternative research population is available; (2) the
study addresses important health needs for the
vulnerable groups, not just the host community
in general; (3) the benefit provided is fair but
incentives are limited to adequate compensation
for time, effort, and any adverse consequences of
participation; and (4) efforts have been made to
involve a representative organization that can assist
participants throughout the process.63
We do not go as far as prohibiting the participation
of vulnerable groups, as this could be considered
discriminatory, both because of the exclusion itself
and because such exclusion creates a knowledge
gap regarding the efficacy of an intervention for
that group. However, differential treatment is
permissible under the human rights conventions as
long as the justification is compatible with the nature
of those conventions and solely for the purpose
of promoting the general welfare.64 Requiring the
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protective measures mentioned above falls within
this permissible zone of differential treatment.

Enforcement
One advantage of using human rights norms to
set a minimum standard of care in clinical trials is
that these norms may be enforceable in developing
countries where ethical regulations of such trials
are inadequate or nonexistent. Violations of human
rights during clinical trials could also be brought
before human rights bodies with individual
complaint procedures, such as the HRC and CESCR,
creating additional avenues for accountability.
Of course, in some countries—most notably the
US—human rights norms are extremely difficult
to enforce. The US does not consider the ICCPR
self-executing and has not ratified the ICESCR. In
addition, the US Supreme Court held in 2013 that
the Alien Tort Claims Act, which had been used
to sue corporations for human rights violations
abroad, does not apply extraterritorially.65 In such
situations, effective regulations that prevent human
rights violations from happening in the first place
are especially critical.
The existence of extensive regulations does
not necessarily mean that they effectively prevent
exploitation. The detailed regulations issued by
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for
example, do not require Investigational New Drug
(IND) applications for foreign clinical trials.66
Although the regulations do generally require
evidence that foreign clinical trials conform to
“good clinical practice” for the data to be used to
support marketing approval or IND applications,
the FDA has the authority to waive that requirement,
including review and approval by an independent
ethics committee.67 Furthermore, the regulations
describing the requirements for obtaining
marketing approval based solely on foreign clinical
data provide that “FDA will apply this policy in a
flexible manner,” again permitting deviation from
the standards.68 Making matters worse, while the
FDA is allowed to perform on-site inspections for
foreign trials, it rarely does so.69 In fact, a study by
the Office of the Inspector General found that the
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FDA inspected less than one percent of foreign
clinical trial sites in 2008.70
Oversight and accountability could be improved
across the board through the creation of an
international body that could review controversial
protocols for clinical trials before they begin,
as well as hear complaints that arise during or
after a trial. This body should include experts
in both bioethics and human rights, thereby
developing complementary standards. Among
other things, such a mechanism could explore how
the international obligation to provide assistance
under human rights treaties relates to the standard
of care in clinical trials. Like the duty to provide a
benefit in bioethics, the obligation to assist under
human rights law need not be limited to paying for
a treatment but could also include paying royalties
generated from the sale of a drug or a fixed amount
based on the principle of proportionality.71 By
applying human rights norms to specific situations
in biomedical research, an international body would
also help develop the content of core obligations.

Conclusion
Bioethics and human rights are both predicated
upon the desire to protect individual freedoms,
promote justice, prohibit exploitation, and ensure
human dignity. The notion of drawing on human
rights norms to analyze the appropriate standard
of care in clinical trials should not, therefore, be
surprising. The real surprise is how little human
rights bodies have thus far engaged dilemmas in
clinical research aside from informed consent.
The framework we propose here of applying nonderogable rights, including the core obligations of
the right to health, to establish a minimum standard
of care for clinical trials represents an initial step
in that direction. Certainly, neither bioethics nor
human rights has resolved internal tensions about
universality versus relativity. Furthermore, some
may dispute the usefulness of core obligations or
disagree about the particular protective measures
proposed here. Such critiques are vital to the
discussion and will help deepen our thinking about
concepts in both fields.
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While this article primarily addresses the
standard of care debate, the promise of collaboration
between the two disciplines extends much further.
In order to make a meaningful difference in the
protection of all human subjects, bioethics must
strive to prevent the conditions in which individuals
are systematically made vulnerable to exploitation.
Adopting a human rights perspective is consistent
with developments in public health ethics and
global health ethics, which seek to address the
larger social, political, and economic forces behind
the increasing inequities in global health—perhaps
the greatest ethical dilemma of all.
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